Overview
The threat that the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ), whose history dates back to the 1960s, poses against Turkey’s national security reached its zenith in the 2010s. During this period, the organization’s members, who had secretly infiltrated the country’s strategically important public institutions over four decades, reached the upper echelons of state bureaucracy. This situation emboldened the group, allowing it to take more daring steps.
The July 15, 2016 coup attempt marked the peak of the FETÖ threat and was, in fact, a product of Turkey’s fight against the organization. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, the Turkish government took measures to limit the group’s access to revenue and new recruits. Finally, undercover FETÖ operatives in strategic agencies were identified. The group’s expectation that its members would be removed from their official posts, and thereby lose the official powers that they had abused for years, resulted in the coup attempt.
The international community has failed to support Turkey in its fight against FETÖ – as in other terrorist organizations. Certain developments, including the acceptance of asylum requests by FETÖ operatives serving in Turkey’s diplomatic missions abroad, deepened the Turkish people’s sense that they were “left alone.” Furthermore, Greece’s refusal to extradite uniformed terrorists, who fled Turkey following the coup attempt’s failure on a military helicopter, demonstrated the extent of the FETÖ threat. Turkey continues its efforts to bring back Fetullah Gülen and his organization’s senior leadership to Turkey to stand trial.
Having paid a dear price in its fight against FETÖ, the Republic of Turkey takes necessary steps to protect its friends and allies from this threat. In this regard, the country has already taken steps to facilitate the transfer of overseas schools, which FETÖ used to find new recruits, to the Maarif Foundation and the capture and bringing to justice of fugitives from law.
Having paid a dear price in its fight against FETÖ, the Republic of Turkey takes necessary steps to protect its friends and allies from this threat. In this regard, the country has already taken steps to facilitate the transfer of overseas schools, which FETÖ used to find new recruits, to the Maarif Foundation and the capture and bringing to justice of fugitives from law.
History
The history of FETÖ, whose deadliest attack took place on July 15, 2016 to kill 251 innocent people and injure over 1400 Turkish citizens, dates back over five decades. Fetullah Gülen, who formed the organization and ruled it with an iron fist until today, laid the groundwork for FETÖ in the 1960s, when he served as a preacher. Having engaged in counter-communism activities during the Cold War, Gülen formed a covert organization that, like other terrorist groups mentioned in this booklet, aimed to undo Turkey’s constitutional order. Unlike the terrorist organizations Daesh and PKK, however, FETÖ conducted its activities by infiltrating public institutions and abusing the official powers of its operatives.
As part of this strategy, which the group has systematically implemented since the 1970s, Gülen’s recruits secretly infiltrated public institutions and formed ‘sleeper cells’ within the state apparatus. FETÖ members gradually rose through the ranks of bureaucracy, facilitating the admission of fellow operatives into public service in the process. As such, by the 1980s, the group’s infiltration effort became more systematic and Fetullah Gülen came to be portrayed as a legitimate actor in the public eye.
In the wake of the Cold War’s end and the Soviet Union’s disintegration, FETÖ turned its attention to international activities. In this regard, it identified recently independent Turkic republics in Central Asia as a priority target, establishing educational institutions there to recruit new members and reproduce its infiltration strategy in other countries.
Another sign of the group’s emphasis on its international operations was Fetullah Gülen’s 1999 relocation to the United States in order to manage his terrorist organization from a luxury compound in rural Pennsylvania.
To be clear, the relocation of FETÖ’s senior leadership to the United States did not result in the mitigation of the threat against Turkey. In the 2000s, the organization’s infiltration efforts were expedited, as its operatives reached the higher levels of bureaucracy. By engaging in other illegal activities, like stealing public service entry examination questions, the group facilitated new recruits to infiltrate state institutions.
Working towards its goal of seizing control of the state apparatus from within to undermine the constitutional order, the terrorist group used to its advantage Turkey’s crackdown on the guardianship regime, which has arbitrarily suppressed the national will for decades, and the democratization process. It effectively sought to replace the dismantled guardianship elements itself. During this period, FETÖ oversaw the removal of public officials, who refused to serve Fetullah Gülen and whom the group saw as rivals of its undercover operatives, from strategically important institutions like the Turkish Armed Forces through mobbing, threats and various plots. Thus FETÖ reached the final stage of its plan to take over the state apparatus.
Turkey took its most decisive steps against the FETÖ threat under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership. During his tenure as prime minister, Erdoğan made it clear that he would not tolerate a ‘parallel state’ and emerged as a FETÖ target when his government moved to shut down so-called educational institutions that the group used to find new recruits and finance its illegal operations. From its headquarters in the United States, the organization attempted to discredit Turkey’s democratically elected government in the eyes of domestic and international audiences through a series of operations.
The Turkish people responded to this assault, which began in late 2013, by rallying behind Erdoğan’s AK Party in the March 2014 municipal elections. The public’s support helped the authorities to crack down on FETÖ’s financing, propaganda and recruitment operations and the removal of FETÖ operatives, who had infiltrated public institutions, from their posts.
Turkey took a series of legitimate steps with sound legal basis within the framework of its counter-FETÖ campaign – which the terrorist group misportrayed to international audiences as a violation of human rights and restrictions on rights and liberties. Various elements, which target Turkey for a number of reasons, conveniently bought into the organization’s allegations and reproduced them – claiming that the Republic of Turkey was conducting a ‘witch hunt’ against an organization, FETÖ, that did not exist.
The bloody coup attempt of July 15, 2016, however, established that Turkey’s security concerns were completely legitimate. FETÖ’s senior leadership, seeing that their operatives within the Turkish Armed Forces been identified and the Turkish authorities were going to relieve them of their official duty at the Supreme Military Council’s upcoming meeting the following month, perpetrated a coup attempt within its own chain of command. The perpetrators were stopped thanks to the resistance of patriots within the state and the civilian population, captured and brought to justice.
For the purpose of dismissing FETÖ operatives from the public institutions they infiltrated and of restoring state security, the Turkish Parliament declared a state of emergency in the wake of the coup attempt. The state of emergency, which was limited to public institutions and therefore had no impact on the daily lives of private citizens, expired after two years. As a result of Turkey’s decisive steps during this period, the FETÖ threat has been largely neutralized.
The Republic of Turkey continues to strive to protect its friends and allies from the FETÖ threat and to bring the organization’s senior leaders, starting with Fetullah Gülen, to justice. In this regard, FETÖ-linked educational institutions abroad are being transferred to the custody of the Maarif Foundation, which was established in 2016, and necessary steps are being taken to bring back FETÖ operatives, who are wanted, to Turkey.
Contemporary
Challenges
Challenges
Turkey made major accomplishments in its fight against FETÖ and, through the cooperation of its state and society, minimized this terror threat. However, our country encounters certain problems in its efforts to combat FETÖ, as in other terrorist groups:

FETÖ ringleader Fetullah Gülen continues to engage in harmful activities, in violation of a long-standing extradition treaty between the Republic of Turkey and the United States, and manages his global terrorist network from a compound in the United States. Moreover, some foreign governments continue to aid and abet terrorists, including criminals who were directly involved in the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. By helping such individual escape justice under the pretext of human rights and liberties, they raise questions about their commitment to counter-terrorism and block efforts to shed light on the coup attempt and, by extension, justice.
Various materials, which FETÖ operatives obtained illegally upon infiltrating Turkey’s strategic institutions, are being used, unlawfully, by certain governments in legal proceedings in an attempt to target our country. This situation fuels concerns about judicial independence in such countries and raises questions about the links and possible cooperation between those governments and FETÖ.
It would be a mistake to misportray Turkey’s legitimate and lawful measures against a secretive organization, which infiltrated public institutions, as human rights violations.
Turkey took a series of legitimate steps with sound legal basis
within the framework of its counter-FETÖ campaign – which the terrorist group misportrayed to international audiences as a violation of
human rights and restrictions on rights and liberties..